CHAD: Gasping for Change

November 2009

By N. Losson

In May 2009, after the defeat of the “Union des Forces de la Resistance” (UFR) by the Chadian National Army (ANT), the political climate and power balance changed drastically in favor of N’Djamena. Despite this military defeat, it appeared that the armed opposition had nonetheless achieved a political victory. The international community, previously unwavering in their refusal to negotiate with Chadian Armed Opposition Groups (CAOG), initiated exploratory missions to identify the political platform of the rebels.

No hope for a comprehensive political process

Unfortunately, this door quickly closed when rebel leaders proved unable to seize the opportunity provided, more concerned with the pay-offs derived from negotiations then trying to resolve the root causes of Chad’s instability. A family dispute that took on regional proportions, Chad's violent political crisis seems to draw to an end but has in no fashion been resolved. CAOG face very little pressure to resolve their grievances with N’Djamena. As long as international pressure keeps Khartoum focused on internal matters, the Government of Sudan (GOS) is unlikely to initiate another major offense on the Chadian capital. The GOS, needing collateral in their own negotiations with N’Djamena, is happy to keep Chadian rebel leaders well compensated, ensuring that they stay right where they are.

In many ways, this serves the Government of Chad (GOC) well since it has to maintain the appearance of an external threat to keep the international community at bay and avoid facing what Khartoum is dealing with. Bracing for the end of the rainy season, the GOC deployed a strong contingent of soldiers at the border with Sudan, instead of dealing with what’s right behind them. In Eastern Chad, the environment remains extremely volatile. Impunity and lawlessness continue to endanger refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs) and humanitarian workers. The United Nations Peacekeeping Operation, MINURCAT, is only mandated to put out fires but not allowed to catch the arsonist.

Preparing for elections and fighting corruption

The August 13th electoral reform agreement, positioned as the center piece of the international community’s strategy for a “democratic transition” [1] in Chad, is bringing little comfort to a humanitarian community who sees this as another way of legitimizing the status quo.

Proposed as a solution by many, it appears unlikely that a comprehensive and inclusive national dialogue will be held in the near future. However, if not comprehensively, maybe one at a time, the roots of Chad’s instability are un-expectantly being addressed. The Government of Chad has focused public attention on fighting corruption. A wave of arrests on corruption charges initiated by the Ministry of State Control and Moralization has begun. Change, even though embryonic, is palpable in the capital city. While few will probably pay the full price for their crimes, these are steps in the right direction. What is sure is that in N’Djamena, Chadians are un-deniably tired with war and gasping for change.

RECOMMENDATIONS to the international community:

Electoral System Reforms:

• Consolidate the advances made by the GOC to continue implementing all parts of the August 13th agreement;
• Invest in the building blocks of democracy such as civic education and building leadership.

Justice System Reforms:

• Monitor cases brought in front of the justice system, particularly high profile corruption cases, and ensure that accused individuals receive a fair trial;
• Ensure that judges are allowed to review all files associated with a case and are free from outside pressure;
• Ensure that those who are found guilty are punished and complete their sentence.

Security Sector Reforms:

• Help break the cycle of violence in Chad by implementing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs for former combatants.

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[1] European Union “10th European Development Fund mid-term review”, 2009 Joint Annual Report, October 2009 (Full Text)