March 2009: Policy Recommendations for further E.U. engagement in Chad

Progress in many development sectors in Chad continues to be impeded by the country’s persistent political instability. Failure to fully implement Article 8 and Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement and address those elements that contribute to the destabilization of Chad has interfered with the European Union’s efforts to maintain and consolidate a stable and democratic political environment. Efforts to engender a “national” dialogue have thus far focused solely on electoral reforms (13 August 2007 agreement), short-cutting the process which could have brought about the development of a comprehensive and integrated peace-building policy and a conflict prevention strategy targeting the root-causes of instability in Chad.

The following recommendations urge the European Union to review their current partnership framework with the Government of Chad and address issues intrinsic to the internal Chadian crisis to help restore peace in a region torn by decades of war:

1. The E.U. in collaboration with other regional stakeholders should support a viable peace process that includes all actors to the crisis (armed and un-armed):

• Call all belligerent parties to a cease fire and urge all parties to participate in a negotiated solution to mitigate the impact of spoilers on the implementation of the August 13th agreement;
• Support the creation of an internationally recognized mediation team to support negotiation and reconciliation efforts with the armed opposition; 
• Appoint a high-level envoy to re-establish direct talks between the government and the main rebel groups.

2. The European Union should strengthen the efforts of Chadians seeking to provide a platform for addressing the root causes of conflict in Chad:

• Urge the Government of Chad (GOC) and the country’s political and armed opposition to engage in an inclusive national dialogue aimed at resolving the root causes of Chad’s internal crisis;
• Empower Chadians to address and resolve conflict drivers in their country, build national leadership and strengthen the collaborative capacity of leaders from all sides of the conflict to engage in peaceful negotiations;
• Exert pressure on the Chadian government to obtain progress on democratization, freedom of press and more transparent and accountable governance.

3. Create conditions for the successful implementation of the August 13th, 2007 electoral reform agreement: 

• Support the creation of a “Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI)” that is fully independent from the “Ministère de l’Administration du Territoire” with full autonomy to select and appoint a “Directeur Général” and independent access to resources to accomplish its objectives;
• Ensure that all parts of the agreement are given equal focus in their implementation, in particular Article 4 concerning the general political climate in Chad:

a. Ensure that the laws that ensue from this agreement respect the parameters established in the agreement;
b. Begin the process of de-militarizing the “Ministère de l’Administration du Territoire” and work on restructuring the Chadian National Army to reflect the ethnic diversity of the population;
c. Broaden the agreement to give all parties to the conflict a stake in its successful implementation;
d. Encourage stronger civic participation in the democratic process and focus on civic education in preparation for 2011 presidential elections.

• In order to give the August 13th agreement more legitimacy and to strengthen its ownership within the E.U., member states which have embassies in the region should regularly send diplomats to take part and assist in the meetings of the "Comité de Suivi de l'Accord du 13 août"
• To improve transparency and accountability, the European Union Troika mission and other E.U. delegations travelling to N’Djamena within the context of the August 13th Agreement should provide regular public reporting on the progress being made towards electoral reforms in Chad.

4. Use the upcoming mid-term review of the 10th EDF to engage the GOC in a political dialogue that includes security sector reforms and good governance programs and begin to address issues such as:

• Peace-building policies and conflict prevention strategies (under Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement);
• Inter-ethnic reconciliation; 
• Equitable distribution of resources and negotiation of a social pact on access to land;
• Greater budgetary transparency and accountability, especially with respect to the Government of Chad’s commitments under EITI and the annulment of the November 2008 law preventing any accountability of public expenditure from 2003 to 2008;
• Security sector reforms, demilitarization and functioning of the state administration, including implementation of the recommendations of the army review, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of rebel combatants;
• Redrawing of administrative boundaries and decentralization; 
• Judicial independence, including reviewing the status of the Supreme Court; 
• Lifting of ordinance n°5 restraining the freedom of the press.

5. Ensure full support for MINUCAT II from European Troop Contributing Countries:

• As operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA is now preparing to transfer to MINURCAT II, European countries that are currently providing troops and/or funding to EUFOR should keep their commitment and contribute to MINURCAT II with at least the same resources;
• Encourage E.U. member countries to maintain their support and urgently replenish the United Nations Trust Fund that helps support the “Détachement Intégré de Sécurité” (DIS).

6. Demand that the Investigation Commission of the February 2008 attacks on N’Djamena complete its task and bring perpetrators of atrocities to justice:

• In the aftermath of the February coup attempt, Commissioner Louis Michel called for the immediate release of imprisoned political leaders. In a late February meeting with President Déby, Commissioner Michel received an assurance that the disappearance of political opponents would be thoroughly investigated. The European Union should demand that justice be served in the case of the disappearance of Dr. Ibn Oumar Mahamat Saleh and other victims of the February attacks.

7. E.U. support (E.C. and bilateral aid) for reconstruction and returns in Eastern Chad should abide by the voluntary right of return of IDPs in line with the U.N. Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement:

• A permanent forum should be constituted with all stakeholders, where IDPs should be duly represented and the wider NGO community systematically consulted on projects before they start to check relevance, safety of the environment and respect with U.N. Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement.