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**Brussels, 26 September 2008**

**REPORT**

**OF THE COMMITTEE OF  
AMBASSADORS' FACT-FINDING MISSION  
TO DJIBOUTI, CHAD AND SUDAN**

**FROM 27 JULY TO 7 AUGUST 2008**

**BY**

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**DRAFT**  
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**I. INTRODUCTION**

**a. Background**

1. At its 803<sup>rd</sup> meeting held on 28 February 2008, the ACP Committee of Ambassadors was informed by **H.E. Mr. Maitine DJOUMBE**, Ambassador of Chad, of the situation in his country following attacks by armed groups against the Chadian government on 2 and 3 February 2008.
2. At the end of the ensuing exchange of views, the Committee of Ambassadors decided to respond favourably to Ambassador DJOUMBE's invitation and send a fact-finding mission to Chad to investigate the emergency situation in that country.
3. At its 806<sup>th</sup> meeting held on 15 May 2008, the Committee of Ambassadors exchanged views on statements made by **H.E. Mr Najeib EL KHEIR EL WAHAB**, Ambassador of the Republic of Sudan, and H.E. Mr. Maitine DJOUMBE, Ambassador of Chad, on the attacks led by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in the city of Omdurman, near Khartoum on 10 May 2008.
4. At the end of the exchange of views and in response to Ambassador EL KHEIR EL WAHAB's invitation, the Committee of Ambassadors decided to send a fact-finding mission to Sudan to investigate the situation which had exacerbated tensions and led to a breakdown in diplomatic relations between Sudan and Chad.
5. Finally, at its Special meeting on 10 July 2008, the Committee of Ambassadors held a lengthy discussion on the request from **H.E. Mr. Mohamed Moussa CHEHEM**, Ambassador of Djibouti, that a mission be sent to Djibouti to verify the reports concerning the presence of Eritrean armed forces at Ras Doumeira, the border region on Djibouti territory.
6. The Committee of Ambassadors decided, therefore, to send a fact-finding mission to Djibouti.
7. For the sake of economy and efficiency, the Committee decided that the same delegation would conduct the mission to all three countries concerned, namely, Chad, Sudan and Djibouti. In that respect, it should be noted that although Eritrea had been cited in the Djiboutian crisis, it was not party to the invitation to dispatch a mission. In fact, the Ambassador of Eritrea to Brussels, **H.E. Mr. Girma ASMEROM**, stated emphatically that Eritrea did not have a problem with Djibouti, but rather with Ethiopia and the United States of America.

## **b. Composition of the mission**

8. The fact-finding mission was made up of the following members:
- H.E. Mr. **Abdou ABARRY**, Ambassador of the Republic of Niger, Head of Delegation;
  - H.E. Mr. **Victorino NKA OBIANG MAYE**, Ambassador of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea;
  - H.E. Mr. **Joseph BONESHA**, Ambassador of the Republic of Rwanda; and
  - Mr. **Mahamane Aoudou Cissé**, Expert - Political Dialogue and Relations with International Organisations, ACP Secretariat.
9. The Mission left Brussels on 26 July 2008 and stayed in Djibouti from 27 to 29 July, in N'Djamena from 30 July to 3 August, and in Khartoum from 4 to 7 August 2008.

## **c. Mandate of the mission**

10. The general mandate of the ACP fact-finding mission was defined in the Terms of Reference approved by the Chairman of the Committee of Ambassadors, H.E. Mr. Mohamed Moussa CHEHEM, the Ambassadors comprising the mission, and the Ambassadors of the countries to be visited (see **ACP/26/056/08 Rev.2** attached hereto).
11. The mandate consisted in:
- gathering information, from all the parties concerned, that would enable an objective assessment of the different crisis situations that had been brought to the attention of the Committee of Ambassadors;
  - obtaining a better understanding of the current dynamics in the two regions concerned, in order to broker a peaceful settlement of the conflicts;
  - promoting the intra-ACP political dialogue framework to open the way for the return of lasting peace among the various countries involved so as to guarantee stability and security in the East and Central African regions of the ACP Group;
  - fostering direct dialogue among the conflicting governments, including the re-establishment of diplomatic relations; and
  - initiating any action that would strengthen the solidarity of the ACP Group and deepen intra-ACP political dialogue.
12. The mission was conducted in harmony with the initiatives carried out by the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Arab League, and the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

#### **d. Methodology**

13. In order to accomplish its mandate in as thorough a manner as possible, the Mission decided that it would meet with the following groupings in each of the three countries:
  - National authorities;
  - Representatives of political parties, civil society and media, as necessary; and
  - Representatives of ACP diplomatic missions accredited to Chad, Sudan and Djibouti, as well as the European Commission delegations in those countries.
14. Prior to each meeting, the members of the Mission met to discuss the best way to present the aim of their mission conduct their interviews, and gather maximum information.
15. Following each meeting or interview, the members of the Mission also met to summarise the information obtained, and adjust their methodology, if necessary, to better prepare for the subsequent activities.
16. It should also be noted that the Authorities of each of the three countries provided the Mission with comprehensive documentation, as well as audiovisual evidence, which facilitated a better understanding of the different issues.

## **II. EXECUTION OF THE MISSION**

### **A. DJIBOUTI**

17. On 27 and 28 July 2008, the ACP Mission met with the various government authorities, and representatives of diplomatic missions and international organisations accredited to Djibouti.

#### **a. Meeting with government authorities**

18. The mission met with the following Djiboutian officials, one after the other:
  - Mr. **Mahmoud Ali YOUSOUF**, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation;
  - His Excellency Mr. **Ismail Omar GUELLEH**, President and Head of Government of the Republic of Djibouti;
  - Mr. **Dileita Mohamed DILEITA**, Prime Minister of Djibouti;
  - Mr. **Ougoureh Kifleh AHMED**, Minister of Defence, and members of his staff.

19. These meetings enabled the mission to compile the following information:
20. On 4 February 2008, Eritrean troops invaded the Ras Doumeira region on the pretext of conducting civil engineering work. All attempts by the Djiboutian authorities to engage the Eritrean Government in dialogue to resolve the situation were bluntly rejected.
21. From 10 to 13 June 2008, Eritrean forces launched attacks, with light and heavy artillery, on Djiboutian forces stationed at the border, leaving 30 dead, 100 wounded and 19 disappearances on the Djiboutian side.
22. All bilateral initiatives were exhausted, and appeals to reason from the Republic of Djibouti and the regional and international community via the African Union, the Arab League, the UN, and allied countries seemed to have no effect on Eritrea.
23. The Djiboutian authorities claim that the region occupied by the Eritrean forces belongs indisputably to Djibouti. They base their claim on two treaties: 1) the Treaty of 11 March 1862 by which Dini Ahmed, Sultan of Raheita, ceded to France, the ports, harbours and anchorage of Obock [...] up to Ras Doumeira in the North; and 2) the Treaty of 1885 by which Dini confirmed the 1862 treaty and stipulated that all the territory from Ras Ali [in the south] to Ras Doumeira [in the north] belonged to France.
24. The delimitation of Ras Doumeira as the northern boundary was confirmed in the Convention of 20 March 1897 between France, the former colonial power, and Menelik II, Emperor of Ethiopia. The Convention stipulates that Mount Ras Doumeira and Doumeira Island were under the sovereignty of France. As such, the territory was transferred to Djibouti when it gained independence on 27 June 1977.
25. From the Djiboutian standpoint, the presence of Eritrean forces at Ras Doumeira demonstrated Eritrea's desire to control that highly strategic region in order to control the Bâb-al-Mandab Strait at the mouth of the Red Sea, a passage used by oil tankers coming from the Persian Gulf.
26. The armed confrontations of 10 and 11 June 2008 between the two countries appear to have been triggered when Eritrean troops opened fire on their Djiboutian counterparts in retaliation for non-compliance with the ultimatum given to the Djiboutian military commanders to return 30 Eritrean deserters seeking refuge on the Djiboutian side.
27. The day after the attacks, which were launched despite appeals for restraint from the international community, the Arab League, the UN Security Council, the AU's Peace and Security Council and IGAD condemned the incursion by Eritrean troops at Ras Doumeira and Doumeira Island. The two countries were ordered to withdraw from the border and so return to the status quo ante. Djibouti complied with the request, while Eritrea, taking advantage of the retreat by the Djiboutian forces, further advanced into Djiboutian territory to occupy the positions vacated by the Djiboutian army.

28. All attempts at mediation (from France, Qatar, Yemen, the AU and the OIC, in particular), and other fact-finding missions were systematically refused by the Eritreans; the reason being that there was no dispute between the two countries, and that Djibouti is the Trojan horse for Ethiopia's and the US' hegemonic ambitions in the Horn of Africa.
29. The Mission also learned that the UN Security Council was planning to send a fact-finding mission to Djibouti on 1 August 2008. The conclusions of that mission and any follow-up action by the Security Council's would be of capital importance and interest to the ACP Group.
30. The Djibouti authorities, led by the President of the Republic, continue to call for dialogue and a peaceful settlement to the crisis. They have expressed a keen desire to maintain peaceful and harmonious relations with Eritrea which has centuries-old tribal and family ties with Djibouti.
31. With regard to the impact on Djibouti's economy, the authorities drew the ACP Mission's attention to the exorbitant cost of the crisis, which they estimate at 5 billion Djibouti francs, or 30 million dollars, just to mobilise the armed forces, and which risks reaching much greater proportions if the crisis continues. They requested financial support from the ACP Group to help them cope with the cost that is putting a strain on the country's development budget.

**b. Meeting with diplomatic representatives**

32. In order to deepen their understanding of the situation between Djibouti and Eritrea, the ACP mission met with the following diplomatic representatives:
  - H.E. Mr. **Dominique DECHERF**, Ambassador of France to Djibouti, and Colonel **Jean Pierre FERLET**, Commander of the French Air Force Base in Djibouti; and
  - Mr. **Eric M. WONG**, Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy of the United States of America to Djibouti, and members of his staff.

Unfortunately, the mission was unable to meet with the European Commission's Head of Delegation because he was not in Djibouti at the time.

33. H.E. Mr. A. ABARRY, Head of the ACP fact-finding Mission, explained the reasons for the delegation's visit to Djibouti in response to the request from the Djibouti authorities. Since Djibouti and Eritrea are both members of the ACP family, the ACP Committee of Ambassadors had heard the positions and viewpoints on the crisis as expressed by both parties during discussions in Brussels.

34. The initiative of the ACP Mission fell within the framework of intra-ACP political dialogue, of which one of the primary goals is to promote a peaceful settlement to any major dispute between ACP States or within an ACP State. As such, the first step was to understand the details of the crisis between two members of the same family, in order to propose solutions to end the crisis.
35. Given the key role that France and the US play in this extremely important geo-strategic region, the ACP mission considered it useful to meet with the diplomatic representatives from those countries to garner additional information that might contribute to their analysis of the situation, especially given France's military presence in Djibouti, and Eritrea's repeated references to US involvement.
36. The frank and transparent exchanges with the diplomatic representatives enabled the Mission to draw the following conclusions:
37. It seems that the border between the two countries had never been an issue since Djibouti's independence in 1977, and Eritrea's independence in 1993. Both countries are claiming sovereignty over the border region by evoking the 1897 Treaty in the case of Djibouti, and the 1900 and 1901 Protocols in the case of Eritrea.
38. The 1897 Treaty concluded between France, the then colonial power in Djibouti, and Ethiopia, appears to confer sovereignty over the Ras Doumeira and Doumeira Island to France. Eritrea, for its part, evokes the 1900 and 1901 Protocols signed by France and Italy, in which France ceded the Doumeira region to Italy. Djibouti contests the validity of these Protocols which they claim were never ratified by the French Parliament.
39. Two hypotheses have been advanced to explain Eritrea's sudden interest in the border region, which had been unoccupied up until then.
40. *Firstly*, Eritrea claims that it has taken up position in the region in order to counter an impending invasion from Ethiopia through that area, and with support from Ras Moussa already occupied by Ethiopian troops. According to the diplomatic representatives interviewed, no military strategy would support that hypothesis, because Ethiopia could attack Eritrea more directly and effectively from their common border, without making a wide detour through Doumeira.
41. *Secondly*, the first phase of a mega-project, funded by **Sheik Tarek Ben Mohamed Ben Laden**, is the construction of a 28-km long bridge over the Bâb-al-Mandab Strait linking Yemen and Djibouti - therefore Asia and Africa. The second phase is the establishment of two new cities on either side of the bridge. On the Djiboutian side, the new city, to be called Madinat-al-Nour (the City of Light), is to be constructed in the Doumeira region, near Moulhoulé and to be used mainly as a free zone and for offshore activities.

42. By occupying Doumeira, Eritrea seemed to be signalling that the construction of such a mega-project that would make Djibouti a major economic destination in the sub-region, and in the world, could not be carried out in the border region without it having a say in the matter.
43. Be that as it may, the Doumeira region is certainly the scene of intense activity which is escalating and, if not addressed quickly, risks further complicating Djibouti-Eritrea relations and aggravating the border crisis.

#### **c. Meeting with the IGAD Secretariat**

44. The InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is the East African regional integration organisation which is the authority for conflict resolution among its Member States. It could play a key role in easing the tension between Djibouti and Eritrea even if the latter has temporarily suspended its membership in the organisation. That is why the ACP Mission sought to meet with the senior officials of the IGAD Secretariat.
45. The mission met with Mr. **Mahboub M. MAALIM**, the newly-elected Executive Secretary of IGAD, at the Organisation's headquarters. After recalling that the Horn of Africa is often subject to all sorts of skirmishes and conflicts, Mr. Maalim mentioned that at the Summit in June 2008, the IGAD Heads of State mandated the Sudanese and Kenyan Foreign Affairs Ministers, as well as the Executive Secretary of IGAD, to approach the Eritrea authorities with an invitation to re-establish their membership in the Organisation. The meeting with the Eritrean authorities was scheduled for 15 August 2008.
46. The IGAD Secretariat and the ACP Mission expressed the hope that the upcoming meeting with the Eritrean President would pave the way for dialogue between Eritrea and Djibouti.

#### **d. Visit to the front line**

47. At the invitation of the Djiboutian authorities, and in order to better understand the situation on the ground, the ACP fact-finding Mission decided to go to the border area where Djiboutian and Eritrean troops had taken up position. Therefore, on 29 July 2008, the delegation was taken to the border area by military plane provided by the Djiboutian army..
48. The Mission was met by **General ZAKARIA** and **Colonel ABDOU DAMBIL** at the advance command post of the Djiboutian army near Moulhoulé, about a dozen kilometres from the Eritrean positions.
49. The military officers gave the mission a detailed account of the situation at the border, complete with slide projection and aerial photographs. In addition to the presence of soldiers, the aerial views clearly showed the roads, trenches, landing strips and other fortifications dug into the side of Ras Doumeira.

50. The officers gave an account of the events and activities that had taken place in the area since February 2008 up to the clashes in June 2008. They also gave a statement on the strength of the available forces, which indicated a clear imbalance in favour of the well-equipped Eritrean army of 250,000 men (compared to 20,000 on the Djiboutian side).
51. The Mission was able to appreciate the precarious situation and difficult living conditions in that desert area, before returning to the air base on board a Djibouti army helicopter.

**e. Conclusions**

52. The fact-finding mission of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors was pleased to have been able to meet the different officials to better understand the facts of the crisis situation between these two Member States of the ACP family that geographical, historical and even family ties should unite rather than divide.
53. The Mission would have been much better off had it been also able to visit Eritrea to gauge the situation from the other side. Nonetheless, the members hope that they will still have the opportunity to better understand the Eritrean position with the aim of brokering a rapprochement between the two brother countries in the framework of intra-ACP political dialogue.
54. Without prejudice, it seems that the reasons for the presence of Eritrean troops in the Doumeira region are linked to fear of an attack from Ethiopia through that region, Eritrea's desire to have a position in that region so as to control the Bâb-al-Mandab Strait, especially given the mega-project to construct a bridge linking Djibouti and Yemen, and the construction of a free zone in the Doumeira area, or even the ramifications of the crisis in Somalia.
55. Based on the meetings and activities conducted on spot, the mission's main conclusion is that the situation is extremely serious and, given the strategic importance of the contested area, it could take on new proportions and lead to the involvement of other major powers. Consequently, a solution through reconciliation and dialogue is absolutely essential and urgent.
56. The Mission nonetheless remains optimistic in the light of the peace and outreach policy advocated by the Djiboutian authorities, who assert that they have neither the means, nor the desire, to dedicate resources and energy to anything other than the development and betterment of the Djiboutian population.

**f. Recommendations**

57. By way of contributing to a peaceful settlement to the crisis between Djibouti and Eritrea, the ACP Mission recommends that the Committee of Ambassadors take the following action:
  - Commend the Republic of Djibouti for withdrawing its troops from the contested positions and encourage it to pursue political dialogue and an outreach approach towards Eritrea;

- Urge the two countries to return to the status quo ante, and to refer their border dispute to a competent international court to decide the matter;
- Take steps to approach the government of the Republic of Eritrea to better understand its position in the crisis, and urge it to re-establish its status within IGAD, and to agree to receive mediation or fact-finding missions;
- Consider the conclusions of the UN fact-finding mission sent to Djibouti on 1 August 2008, as well as UN Security Council's follow-up action;
- Consider the outcome of IGAD's mediation mission to meet with the Eritrean authorities on 15 August 2008;
- Examine the Djibouti-Eritrea crisis within a regional perspective encompassing Ethiopia and Somalia since the issues marring relations among the four countries seem to be linked to the crisis in Somalia due to alliances with the different Somalian factions.
- Consider the possibility of providing financial assistance to Djibouti, through the financial instruments of the Cotonou Agreement, to help that country cope with the financial losses from this crisis, estimated at some 30 million dollars, to the detriment of development-related actions.

## **B. CHAD**

58. Between 30 July and 3 August 2008, the fact-finding Mission of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors met with top-level Chadian authorities, representatives of diplomatic missions and UN agencies, as well as representatives of the Coordination Unit of the Political Parties for the Defence of the Constitution (CPDC). The delegation also visited public buildings that were destroyed during the attacks by the rebel groups. Unfortunately, for various reasons, the Mission was unable to meet with Civil Society representatives, the Commission of Enquiry into the disappearance of political figures, and other organs, as was initially planned.

### **a. Meetings with Chadian government authorities**

59. The ACP Mission met with the following government officials in N'Djamena:

- Mr. **Mahamat HISSEINE**, Minister of Communication, Spokesperson for the Government, acting Minister of External Relations;
- Mr. **Nassour Guélendouksia OUAÏDOU**, Speaker of the National Assembly

- Mr. **Youssef Saleh ABBAS**, Prime Minister, Head of Government;
  - Mrs. **Aziza BAROUD**, Secretary of State for Economy and Planning, responsible for Microfinance and the Fight against Poverty; and
  - His Excellency Mr. **Idriss DEBY ITNO**, President of the Republic of Chad, in the presence of Mr. **Moussa Faki MAHAMAT**, Minister of External Relations.
60. The exchanges dealt essentially with the consequences of the attacks led by armed rebel groups in February and June 2008, the political dialogue process initiated within the country, as well as the status of relations between Chad and neighbouring Sudan.
61. The Mission learned that the attack on 3 and 4 February was the 28<sup>th</sup> of its kind and the second one to have involved the capital N'Djamena. That attack, together with the June attack, resulted in heavy losses in human lives, substantial destruction of public property and profound trauma for the Chadian population. The country is having a difficult time recovering from the acts of violence and vandalism committed by the rebel groups during the assaults which have severely damaged the country's economy: ransacking and destruction of ministerial offices and other public buildings (with the conspicuous exception of banking establishments), destruction of administrative archives and the sabotage of State institutions.
62. The difficult task of restoring destroyed sites, reinforcing defence capacities, rebuilding institutional capacities, and restoring national confidence have practically absorbed the budget surplus of 146 billion CFA Francs (approx. 225 million Euros) generated from oil resources.
63. The Chadian authorities are of the opinion that the rebel groups could not have launched attacks of that magnitude without support from external forces, and did not hesitate to cite Sudan as being behind the attacks intended to destabilise the Chadian regime.
64. They felt that the acts of aggression against Chad are a direct consequence of the crisis in Darfur and that they will continue as long as the Darfur issue is not resolved once and for all. Chad is paying a huge price for that crisis: the administration of the refugee camps set up on Chadian territory involves considerable financial and social costs.
65. The Chadian government affirms that it played no role whatsoever in the attack perpetrated against the city of Omdurman, Sudan, by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). According to reports, identification cards found on the rebels who were taken prisoners came from the Chadian diplomatic representation in Khartoum, which was pillaged at the time of the crisis. That situation led the Sudanese authorities to sever diplomatic ties with Chad.
66. The Chadian authorities, including **President DEBY ITNO**, said that they were in favour of easing tensions with Sudan and the resumption of diplomatic relations with their neighbour in due course, on condition that all the problems are settled.

67. The ACP Mission commended that spirit which it considers a positive step towards warmer relations between Chad and Sudan; it also welcomed President DEBY ITNO's desire for peace and national reconciliation, as enshrined in the 13 August Political Accord and promoted at all levels, from government authorities to non-State actors.
68. With regard to internal political dialogue that is not inclusive, the official position of the authorities is that the political and military organisations do not have a national agenda, and are still not within the constitutional framework. As such, they cannot be included in the 13 August Political Accord.

**b. Meeting with the Follow-up and Support Committee on the 13 August Political Accord**

69. The Mission was invited to meet with the Follow-up and Support Committee on the 13 August Political Accord.
70. It should be recalled that 87 political parties signed the "Political Accord to reinforce democracy in Chad" on 13 August 2007, under the auspices of the European Union. The aim of the Accord, known as the "13 August Accord" is to ease tensions in the political environment in Chad, and launch the process for political dialogue and national reconciliation in preparation for legislative elections to be held in 2009. A Committee was set up to follow-up and support the implementation of the Accord which was suspended for several months following the February 2008 attacks. The Committee is made up of representatives of the governing party, so-called parties of the democratic opposition, and the international community. It currently regroups 90 of the 100 legal parties in Chad.
71. The aim of the Accord is to regulate the entire political environment in Chad, by seeking a consensus on government management and strengthening the democratic process. The Accord must make all necessary provisions to guarantee the transparency of elections, prepare, to that effect, instruments such as the electoral law, an independent national elections commission, and conduct all operations leading to the elections and, more specifically, define the administrative districts and organise the population census.
72. The 13 August Accord is clearly important given that poorly conducted elections often lead to violence and result in political and social crises in African countries. All the necessary support should therefore be provided to the Follow-up Committee to enable it to successfully accomplish its mandate.

**c. Meeting with representatives of the CPDC political parties**

73. The mission also met with representatives of the National Alliance for Democracy and Development (AND), a member of the Coordination Unit of Political Parties for the Defence of the Constitution (CPDC).
74. The AND representatives expressed their concerns about possible reprisals against the democratic opposition, the lack of information on the disappearance of their political leader IBNI OUMAR MAHAMAT SALEH, persistent insecurity, the risk of the resumption of armed conflict, as well as recurring violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

75. On the other hand, they were pleased with the conclusion of the 13 August Accord which, in their view and that of the entire Chadian population and the international community, constitutes a solid basis for the political stability and sustainable development of Chad.
76. Nonetheless, they deplored the delay in the implementation of the Accord especially as regards the population census, conformity of the legislative and legal texts, and the administrative reforms (demilitarization of territorial Administration, depoliticization of Public Administration etc.). They also regretted the inadequacy of the resources made available to the Follow-up Committee on the Accord and hoped that its scope would be expanded to include all the political actors such as the armed movements.
77. The ACP Mission urged the representatives to defend their point of view by participating actively in the implementation of the Accord.

**d. Meeting with representatives of ACP and AU diplomatic missions**

78. To broaden its information base, the ACP Mission met with the Diplomatic Representatives of the following countries: Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, and Republic of Congo.
79. The meeting was very instructive for it enabled the ACP Mission to better understand the factors hindering the process of internal political dialogue. It showed clearly that the resolution of the Darfur crisis is the key to the internal problems in Chad and Sudan, which are accusing each other of attempting to destabilize the other by supporting rebel groups on both sides of their common border.
80. It was also observed that armed movements constitute a political force which should not be ignored in the dialogue. It would be advisable, therefore, to appoint a facilitator who could promote communication between the political parties and the armed movements on the need for dialogue, although personal clashes could often hinder this approach.
81. The representatives unanimously commended the ACP Group's initiative to send a mission to Chad and Sudan to help bring about a rapprochement between the two countries.

**e. Meeting with EU Ambassadors**

82. Unfortunately, the mission was unable to meet the European Commission's Head of Delegation and EU Ambassadors due to difficulties in organising the necessary appointments.

**f. Meeting with the UN agencies**

83. The mission met with representatives of the UN system, namely:
- Mr. **Victor DA SILVA ANGELO**, Special Representative for the UN Mission to Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), and
  - Mr. **Kingsley AMANING**, Resident UNDP Representative.
84. After hearing the statement on the reasons for the ACP fact-finding mission to Chad, and commending the ACP Group for the excellent initiative, the representatives of the UN presented the following observations and analyses on the situation in Chad:
85. The new government of Chad has acquired renewed credibility due to its ability to maintain some political balance, which was an encouraging sign for the establishment and deepening of political dialogue;
86. The Follow-up Committee on the 13 August Political Accord has become more credible, but should now draw up a concrete timetable for the elections. The Accord itself should be extended to other parties;
87. The secular question remains a source of concern that calls for the combined efforts of the Chadian State and the international community, in developing programmes like the UN programme to train policemen;
88. As regards relations between Chad and Sudan, the ACP Mission pointed out that the Follow-up Committee had entered a more concrete phase, with the proposal to set up a mechanism for monitoring and controlling borders. This development could contribute to the return of confidence between the two countries which could lead to positive prospects for the settlement of internal problems;
89. In addition to easing the tension between Sudan and Chad, it is indispensable to secure the border zone with the Central African Republic, which, if left uncontrolled, could become a sanctuary for all kinds of criminals.

**g. Visits to sites destroyed during the attacks by rebel forces**

90. The Mission visited several sites to observe the damage caused by the attacks of 2 and 3 February 2008. It first visited the National Assembly Headquarters accompanied by the Speaker of the National Assembly, Mr. Nassour Guélendouksia OUAÏDOU, with whom it had met previously.
91. The Head of the ACP Mission, H.E. Mr. Abdou ABARRY, expressed to the Press his concern and firm condemnation of such acts of sheer vandalism which resulted from a total lack of civic responsibility.

92. From there, the Mission visited the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Professional Training and the headquarters of the local NGO, AMASOT, to observe the same scene of desolation following the passage of the armed groups through the capital, N'Djamena.
93. The Mission was particularly outraged by the ransacking and plunder suffered by AMASOT (Association for Social Marketing in Chad), an NGO whose activity is entirely devoted to ensuring the well being of the civilian population through its fight against HIV/AIDS and care of HIV/AIDS victims.
94. The damage to the property of the Ministry of Higher Education and AMASOT, as communicated to the Mission, was estimated at 1.119.900.000 FCFA, or 1.709.700 Euros and 317.481.750 FCFA, or 484.700 Euros, respectively.

#### **h. Conclusions**

95. The aim of the fact-finding Mission of the Committee of Ambassadors was, in a general framework, to promote Intra-ACP dialogue framework and more specifically to garner as much information, as possible, and undertake constructive measures in three areas: the attacks perpetrated by the rebel groups in February and June 2008 and the political and humanitarian repercussions; assessment of the process of political dialogue and national reconciliation and the state of the relations between Chad and Sudan.
96. The Mission was able to see the extent of damage to national infrastructures by the assault in February and June, note the considerable efforts made by the Chadian authorities to reconstruct the country using resources which should normally be used for the country's development and the well being of the populations.
97. From the meetings held with the various government, diplomatic and other authorities, the Mission was pleased to note that the real dynamics for political and social peace dialogue was on course thanks to the implementation of the so-called 13 August political Accord, the main objective of which was to improve the electoral process, and to arrive at a national consensus on good governance and sustainable development.
98. As regards the relations between Chad and Sudan, the Mission was pleased with the spirit displayed by the highest authorities of Chad who, despite the real difficulties encountered in their relations with neighbouring Sudan, are giving priority to their outreach policy with a view, not only to settling their differences peacefully with their neighbour, but also contributing to the search for a final solution to the Darfur crisis which would be beneficial to the two countries internally. To this end, direct dialogue is indispensable between these two countries which must, from all indications, work closely together, and it is encouraging to note that the Chadian authorities appear to be in favour of resuming diplomatic ties with Sudan.

## **i. Recommendations**

99. The mission recommends that the Committee of Ambassadors :

- Commend the Government of Chad, especially President Idriss DEBY ITNO, for the support given to the Follow-up and Support Committee on the 13 August Accord.
- Call on all the political actors to contribute to the stabilization of the internal political situation between the government and the democratic opposition.
- Urge the Chadian authorities to find an acceptable formula for including in the Accord and the ongoing political dialogue, all the active forces, political-military organizations, especially through the effective implementation of the Syrte Agreements.
- Encourage all mediation aimed at promoting cordial relations between Chad and Sudan, especially the initiative under the patronage of President WADE of Senegal through the Dakar Agreements and the implementation of a mechanism to monitor and control the border, capable of restoring confidence and promoting the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
- Take note of the contribution of the EUFOR and MINUCART forces to stability and security in Chad and the subregion.
- Advocate that Central African Republic be taken into account in all attempts to restore peace between Sudan and Chad.
- Examine, in the framework of the financial instruments of the Cotonou Agreement, the possibility of helping the Chadian authorities cope with the financial costs resulting from the February and June 2008 attacks.

## **C. SUDAN**

100. The day after the attack on the town of Omdurman by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on 10 May 2008, the Committee of Ambassadors adopted a Declaration in which it condemned the incident and decided to send a fact-finding mission to Sudan at the invitation of the Sudanese authorities. The fact-finding Mission led by H.E. Mr. Abdou ABARRY, fell therefore within this framework.
101. Meanwhile, another new international conflict situation had been created following the decision by the Public Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to request that an arrest warrant be issued against H.E. Mr. Omar El Bashir, President of the Republic of Sudan, for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The new context, had consequently, had an influence on the priority objective of the ACP Mission.

102. Between 4 and 6 August 2008, the Mission met with various actors. By way of introduction, at the various meetings, the Head of the ACP Mission systematically outlined a number of principles underpinning the intra-ACP political dialogue framework and recalled the precise position of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors concerning the main issues tackled.
103. He indicated, among other things, that while the Group adhered to the principle of international justice, and acknowledged the ICC's important role in the fight against impunity, it could not support a two-tiered justice system, nor disregard for the sovereignty of States.
104. The ACP Group, like the other regional and International organisations such as the African Union, Arab League, Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), strongly condemned the decision of the ICC Public Prosecutor, deeming it all the more unacceptable since it was the first time that such an instrument was being used against a President-in-Office who also happened to be the incumbent President of the Summit of ACP Heads of State and Government.
105. Furthermore, such an initiative was considered inappropriate because it could undermine the implementation of the Global Peace Agreement (GPA) concluded in Sudan and seriously compromise the positive ongoing process in Sudan for the resolution of the Darfur crisis.
106. Nonetheless, one should not be mistaken. As controversial as this decision might be, it served as a painful reminder of the need to harmonize all the actions of the international community for the rapid and definitive settlement of the conflict in southern Sudan.
107. Concerning the attacks perpetrated by rebel groups, such as JEM in Omdurman, the Head of the ACP Mission reaffirmed the ACP Group's position in principle, namely the unequivocal condemnation of any attempt to seize power by the force of arms in contempt of all the legal means guaranteed by the Constitution.
108. He finally expressed to the various interlocutors present the ACP Group's desire for the resumption of dialogue between Sudan and Chad, which would be possible only through the restoration of diplomatic ties between the two countries. In fact, the restoration of confidence and peace between these two countries which are very close to one another historically, traditionally and geographically, would contribute substantially to the resolution of many recurrent internal problems on both sides of the border. He also briefed the Sudanese authorities of the goodwill shown by their Chadian counterparts towards the resumption of diplomatic ties and hoped that this momentum would find a favourable echo in Sudan.
109. This was the Mission's message at all its meetings and interviews in Khartoum.

**a. Consultation meeting with Mr. Jean PING, President of the AU Commission**

110. The ACP Mission arrived in Khartoum on 3 August 2008 on the same flight as Mr. Jean PING, President of the AU Commission. Mr. PING expressed the desire to meet with the ACP Mission on the ICC question.
111. The meeting, which was held in the airport, was merely an exchange of views since the AU and the ACP Group shared the same position on the condemnation of the ICC decision.

**b Meeting with Government authorities**

112. The ACP Mission met with the following officials:
- Mr. **Ali Osman TAHA**, 2<sup>nd</sup> Vice-President of the Republic of Sudan ;
  - H.E. Mr. **Omar Hassan EI BASHIR**, President of the Republic of Sudan;
  - Mr. **Ahmed Ibrahim AL-TAHIR**, Speaker of the National Assembly;
  - Dr. **Nafi ALI**, Special Adviser to the President on Darfur;
  - General **Mjzoub Rahama ALBADUEI**, Director of International Relations at the Ministry of Defence;
  - Mr. **Elsamani ELWASILA ELSAMANI**, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
113. The meetings revealed that all the countries had rallied behind the Head of State in denouncing the ICC's allegations as unfair, if not insulting, to a man who had boldly embarked on a peace process not only in Darfur, but throughout Sudan.
114. In Sudan, the ICC's decision was considered a plot by Western countries, led by the United States, which cannot accept China's involvement in developing Sudan's oil resources.
115. The Sudanese authorities were not bothered by the machinations of any institution whose authority they did not recognise and to whose treaties they were not signatories.
116. The authorities informed the Mission that the crimes committed in Darfur would not go unpunished, which is why an Attorney General had been appointed to look into the matter.
117. They thanked the ACP Group for its solidarity with Sudan and for having adopted a declaration condemning ICC decision. The text of the declaration was handed over personally to President EI Bashir by H. E. Mr. Abarry.

118. The officials urged the ACP Group and the African countries as a whole, to oppose the problems befalling Sudan today, which if not handled properly, could happen to any other African country in future.
119. With regard to Darfur, the Sudanese authorities discussed the necessary conditions for arriving at a national consensus that would ensure more effective power sharing. A peace initiative is underway with the CPA; there is need, therefore, to maintain and strengthen it, especially as a result of the national Agreement concluded with other political parties such as Al Mahdi's UNP.
120. Sudan's relations with Chad have worsened considerably following the attacks on Omdurman in which the Sudanese authorities see Chad's involvement. In the interest of resuming good neighbourly relations with Chad in order to restore peace and stability in the subregion, the Sudanese authorities are in favour of resuming diplomatic relations with their neighbour.

**c. Meeting with Mr. Al Sadig AL MAHDI, President of Umma National Party**

121. Mr. Al Mahdi is the leader of one of the main opposition parties, known as Umma National Party (UNP). Mr. Al Mahdi's position on the ICC issue is that it is an undeniable fact that war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed in Darfur and the perpetrators should not go unpunished. On the other hand, the request for the indictment of an incumbent Head of State could have disastrous effects on Sudan's internal stability.
122. Nonetheless, Al Mahdi was of the opinion that the ICC should be salvaged and protected because it is an institution with an important role to play within the International Community. In the face of the crimes against humanity, Al Mahdi proposed a hybrid formula combining the obligation to report and the stability to deliberate via the UN Security Council.
123. Concerning the resolution of the conflicts in Sudan, Al Mahdi declared that since the CPA had demonstrated its limitations, it was advisable to find an inclusive mechanism in which all the parties present would be involved in such a way as to reach a national consensus. The national Agreement concluded in May 2008, primarily between UNP and the ruling party, NCP, could serve as a basis for this national consensus.
124. Al Mahdi also considered the resumption of diplomatic relations between N'Djamena and Khartoum desirable if the peace process in the subregion was to gather additional momentum. He goes even further by proposing that a vast cooperation programme be established between the states of the subregion based on the potential offered by the Nile.

**d. Meeting with Representatives of ACP and AU Diplomatic missions**

125. The Mission held a briefing session with the Ambassadors or representatives of the following countries: DR Congo, Central African Republic, Somalia, Egypt, Libya, Niger, Morocco, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mali, Uganda, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia and Djibouti.

126. The meeting which was chaired by the Head of the ACP Mission, H.E. Mr. A. ABARRY, was given logistical support by H.E. Mr. Najeib EL KHEIR EL WAHAB, Ambassador of the Republic of Sudan to Brussels. The participants unanimously acknowledged that the indictment of President El Bashir was not only unfair but also dangerous for the peace process in Sudan.

127. Several diplomats felt that the situation in Sudan was improving day by day, but that these positive developments were not seen by the outside world. They acknowledged, however, that more decisive progress in resolving the crisis situation in Darfur was necessary, because the consequences of the crisis were weighing heavily on the neighbouring countries such as Central African Republic and Chad.

**e. Meeting with Mr. Ashraf Jahangir QAZI, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Sudan**

128. Mr. Qazi, the United Nations Special Representative to Sudan, explained that the UNMIS mission was to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the North and South Sudan, which should lead to elections at the end of July 2009.

129. The Accord remains fragile, but its implementation was continuing despite violent confrontations between the Government Forces (in the North) and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (in the South), in Abyei. Some progress had even been made with the adoption of electoral laws and the implementation of the national census exercise. The arrest warrant requested by the ICC Public Prosecutor was a matter of concern for the continuation of the UN operations in Sudan but the Sudanese authorities had given assurances in this regard, the Special Representative said.

**f Meeting with EU Representatives**

130. The ACP Mission met with the following EU representatives :

- H.E. Mrs. **Christine ROBICHON**, Ambassador of France ;
- H.E. Mr. **Cario DE FILIPPI**, Ambassador, Head of EC Delegation ; and
- Mr. **Alessandro DE MASI** of the Embassy of Italy.

131. The Mission gave the reasons for its presence in Sudan and recalled the essential elements and the fundamental element underlying the political dialogue between the ACP and the EU as enshrined in Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement. It also recalled the important role played in Sudan by the Facility to Support Peace in Africa financed from the resources allocated to ACP States in the framework of the EDF.

132. The EU Representatives also highlighted the importance of ACP-EU political dialogue, which the Diplomatic Missions of the EU Member States practise daily in the various countries where they are assigned.

133. They deplored the fact that Sudan had not yet ratified the Cotonou Agreement, indicating that the ratification and the ICC issue were two separate matters. In this regard, the participants pointed out that, within the present context, the ratification of the Cotonou Agreement by countries that had not yet done so, including Sudan, could be hindered by references made to the ICC in the preamble and to Article 11 of the Agreement.
134. As regards the essential elements underpinning the ACP-EU Partnership, the EU representatives drew the Mission's attention to the death sentences pronounced on individuals accused of participating in the attacks on Omdurman, in defiance of international norms on the matter.
135. The representatives highlighted the major importance of the CPA, which they considered the political backbone of Sudan. In the light of the above, any analysis of the situation in Sudan should take account of progress in the implementation of this agreement.
136. As regards the ICC issue, the EU Representatives acknowledged that the request for the indictment of President Al Bashir at this juncture could only jeopardize the ongoing peace process, but that the ICC was an independent institution, which was not in the service of the EU foreign policy contrary to what is maintained in certain circles in Sudan. The timing of the decision would have undoubtedly been different if the Sudanese authorities had cooperated with the ICC regarding the implementation of the arrest warrant for the Sudanese officials accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.
137. In conclusion, the two sides agreed that the ACP Group and the European Union should pursue close cooperation, not only with a view to maintaining peace and stability in their common space, but also to saving the future of the ICC and the fight against impunity.

#### **g. Conclusions**

138. The ACP Committee of Ambassadors' Mission to Sudan was given a warm welcome in Khartoum, not only by the country's authorities, but also by all the national and international actors encountered. The meetings were always meaningful exchanges between interlocutors desirous of contributing to resolving the problems whose gravity and importance were known to all parties.
139. From the various meetings and observations, the Mission realised that there was a drive to restore peace and national consensus in Sudan and that it was important to support all the efforts being made in this regard. The Darfur crisis and the tension in southern Sudan were extremely complex phenomena whose impact has serious repercussions on the other countries in the region.
140. The ongoing peace process should not be hindered by any subversive action or any ill-timed occurrence such as the ICC decision. The Mission acknowledges that international justice is a duty of the International Community, but it must be carried out with equity and discernment so that it does not do more harm than the wrong it seeks to redress.

141. As regards the relations between Sudan and Chad, the Mission was pleased to encounter in Khartoum the same will to close the chapter on the persistent confrontations in order to embark, in all sincerity, on the task of resuming friendly, brotherly and neighbourly ties to guarantee sustainable peace and stability in the region. The resumption of diplomatic relations, the principle of which seems to be accepted by both parties and the restoration of mutual trust, will undoubtedly enable the two countries to resolve their internal conflicts.

#### **h. Recommendations**

142. To safeguard and strengthen the peace process begun in Sudan, the ACP Mission wishes to recommend that the ACP Committee of Ambassadors :
- Urge the Sudanese authorities to pursue their search for national consensus initiated in the framework of the May 2008 National Agreement.
  - Suggest that the Sudanese authorities embark on a large scale media campaign to inform the entire International Community of the progress made in the framework of the various peace agreements and other ongoing initiatives in Sudan, since better visibility of its achievements would help to further enhance the country's image in the outside world.
  - Congratulate the Sudanese Government for appointing an attorney general to handle war crimes committed in Darfur and encourage it to provide the attorney general with all the necessary resources to carry out his mission successfully.
  - Encourage all mediation aimed at improving the relations between Sudan and Chad, especially the initiative by President WADE of Senegal in the framework of the Dakar Agreements and the creation of a border monitoring and control mechanism, likely to restore confidence and facilitate the resumption of diplomatic relations between Khartoum and N'Djamena.

### **III. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS**

143. The mission recommends that, following examination and adoption by the Committee of Ambassadors, this report be forwarded to all individuals and organs concerned, in particular the highest authorities of the countries visited.
144. The Mission requests that the Chair of the Committee of Ambassadors address an acknowledgement letter to thank the highest authorities of the Republic of Djibouti, the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Sudan for their warm welcome, and facilitating the work of the ACP Mission.

145. Given the questions and general stir caused by the recent decision taken by the President of the International Criminal Court to issue a warrant for an incumbent Head of State, the Mission is of the opinion that in relation to the ratification of the Cotonou Agreement and in the framework of its impending revision, greater attention should be paid to the provisions of the Agreement that refer to the International Criminal Court, particularly in the Preamble and Article 11.
146. Lastly, the Mission recommends that the Presidents of Djibouti, Chad and Sudan be urged to take advantage of the 6<sup>th</sup> ACP Summit scheduled for Accra (Ghana) on 2 and 3 October 2008 on the theme « *Promoting human security and development* » to exchange views with their colleagues and try to find solutions to the crises which have not yet been addressed in the meantime.

#### **IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

147. The Committee of Ambassadors' fact-finding Mission sincerely thanks the authorities of the Republic of Djibouti, Republic of Chad and the Republic of Sudan for the facilities put at its disposal to enable it to carry out its mandate in the best conditions possible.
148. Special thanks go to:

##### **Djibouti :**

- H.E. Mr. Mohamed Moussa CHEHEM, Ambassador of Djibouti to Brussels;
- The Officers and Staff of the Air Force Base of the Djibouti Armed Forces and the Moulhoulé Advance Command Post ; and
- The State Protocol Service.

##### **Chad :**

- H.E. Mr. Maïtine DJOUMBÉ, Ambassador of Chad to Brussels ;
- The State Protocol Service;
- The staff of the Douguia site; and
- Mr. Mahamat Adoum ISMAEL, former Expert at the ACP Secretariat, who showed us around his experimental spirulina farm.

##### **Sudan :**

- H.E. Mr. Najeib EL KHEIR EL WAHAB, Ambassador of Sudan to Brussels;
- Ambassador ALI, Director-General of Protocol ; and
- The State Protocol Service.

149. Finally, the Mission wishes to sincerely thank the ACP Committee of Ambassadors and the Secretariat for entrusting it with the execution of the mandate.

**H.E. Mr. Abdou  
ABARRY**

**H.E. M. Victorino NKA  
OBIANG MAYE**

**H.E. Mr. Joseph BONESHA**

**ANNEX**

**ACP/26/056/08 Rev.1**  
**PAHD/MAC/enm**  
*Or: FR/Tr: JA/Rev:AM*

**Brussels, 25 July 2008**

**TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE  
ACP COMMITTEE OF AMBASSADORS' FACT-FINDING MISSION  
TO CHAD, SUDAN AND DJIBOUTI**

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**A. CONTEXT OF THE MISSION**

1. At its 803<sup>rd</sup> meeting on 28 February 2008, the ACP Committee of Ambassadors heard a communication from H.E. Mr. Maïtine DJOUMBE, Ambassador of Chad, on the situation in his country following the attacks by armed groups against the Chadian government at the beginning of February 2008.
2. Following an exchange of views on the communication, and in response to Ambassador DJOUMBE's invitation, the Committee of Ambassadors decided to send a fact-finding mission to Chad to investigate the emergency situation in that country.
3. At its 806<sup>th</sup> meeting on 15 May 2008, the Committee of Ambassadors exchanged views on the communications made by H.E. Mr Najeib EL KHEIR EL WAHAB, Ambassador of the Republic of Sudan, and H.E. Mr. Maïtine DJOUMBE, Ambassador of Chad, on the attacks led by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on 10 May 2008 in the city of Omdurman, near Khartoum.
4. At the end of the exchange of views and in response to Ambassador EL KHEIR EL WAHAB's invitation, the Committee of Ambassadors decided to send a fact-finding mission to Sudan to investigate the situation which exacerbated tensions and led to a breakdown in diplomatic relations between Sudan and Chad.
5. At its Special Meetings on 7 and 10 July 2008, the Committee of Ambassadors held a lengthy discussion on the invitation it had received from H.E. Mr. Mohamed Moussa CHEHEM, Ambassador of Djibouti, requesting that a mission be sent to Djibouti to verify the reports concerning the presence of Eritrean armed forces on Djibouti territory.
6. Following that exchange of views, the Committee of Ambassadors decided that it would send a fact-finding mission to Djibouti.
7. In the interest of economy and efficiency, the Committee decided that the same delegation would conduct the mission to all three countries concerned, namely, Chad, Sudan and Djibouti. It asked the Secretariat to define the practical modalities for the mission, including its itinerary, in consultation with the Embassies of the three countries.

## **B. MANDATE**

8. The general mandate of the Committee of Ambassadors' fact-finding mission will consist in the following:
  - a. Gathering information, from all the parties concerned, that would enable an objective assessment of the different crisis situations that have been brought to the attention of the Committee of Ambassadors;
  - b. Fully understanding the current dynamics in the two regions in order to broker a peaceful settlement of the conflicts;
  - c. Promoting the intra-ACP political dialogue framework to pave the way for the restoration of lasting peace among the various countries involved that would guarantee stability and security in the East and Central African regions of the ACP Group;
  - d. Fostering direct dialogue among the highest authorities with a view to re-establishing diplomatic relations; and
  - e. Initiating any action that would strengthen the solidarity of the ACP Group and deepen the intra-ACP political dialogue.
9. In order to accomplish its mandate, the mission will undertake the following tasks:

### **Djibouti**

- a. Gather first-hand information on the bloody clashes between Djiboutian and Eritrean forces in the border region of Ras Doumeira;
- b. Assess the reports that Eritrea was occupying Ras Doumeira;
- c. Assess the political and humanitarian repercussions of the crisis within the national and regional contexts; and
- d. Find out from the Djiboutian government what assistance the ACP Group might provide to bring about a peaceful settlement of the crisis.

### **Chad**

- a. Gather first-hand information about the attacks carried out in Chad February and June 2008;
- b. Assess the damage caused by the fighting that ensued and try to get a clearer understanding of the motives behind the attack;
- c. Assess the political and humanitarian repercussions of the crisis within the national and regional contexts; and
- d. Find out from the Chadian government what assistance the ACP Group might provide to alleviate the problems.

## **Sudan**

- a. Gather first-hand information on the 10 May 2008 attack by the Justice and Equality Movement on the city of Omdurman and against the Sudanese government;
  - b. Assess the damage caused by the fighting that ensued and try to get a clearer understanding of the motives behind the attack;
  - c. Assess the political and humanitarian repercussions of the crisis within the national and regional contexts; and
  - d. Find out from the Sudanese government what assistance the ACP Group might provide to support peace and stability in Sudan.
10. The Committee of Ambassadors' fact-finding Mission will be conducted in keeping with the initiatives set up by the African Union, the United Nations, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the Arab League.
  11. The Mission could depart on 25 July 2008. The delegation will spend three days in each of the three countries.
  12. To accomplish its mandate in as thorough a manner as possible, the mission will meet with the following officials in each of the three countries:
    - a. National authorities;
    - b. Representatives of political parties, civil society and media, as appropriate;
    - c. Representatives of ACP diplomatic missions accredited to Chad, Sudan and Djibouti, as well as the European Commission delegations in those countries.

## **C. COMPOSITION OF THE MISSION**

13. The ACP Committee of Ambassadors' fact-finding mission to Chad, Sudan and Djibouti will comprise the following persons:
  - a. H. E. Mr. Abdou ABARRY, Ambassador of the Republic of Niger (Head of Delegation);
  - b. H.E. Mr. Victorino NKA OBIANG MAYE, Ambassador of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea;
  - c. H. E. Mr. Joseph BONESHA, Ambassador of the Republic of Rwanda; and
  - d. Mr. Mahamane Aoudou CISSÉ, Expert from the ACP Secretariat.

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